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Introduction  
 
The mantra preached in nearly every introductory economics course is simple and 
universal – holding all else equal, when price goes up, consumption falls.  However, 
this truism may not hold for scenarios more involved than those discussed in 
Economics 101.  For example, when a consumer is not entirely sure of a product’s 
quality because quality is highly subjective (e.g., fashion or art), novel (e.g., a new 
technology), or difficult to verify prior to purchase (e.g., credence attributes like 
organic or dolphin-safe certifications), consumers may turn to one or more signals – 
including price – to form quality perceptions.   
 
Products containing genetically modified (GM) ingredients meet each of the 
aforementioned criteria, i.e., GM ingredients are novel, their presence is difficult to 
verify, and their impact on quality may be viewed differently across individuals 
with the same knowledge.  This leads to additional difficulty for product managers 
attempting to formulate pricing strategy in the presence of more a complex quality 
signaling environment.  The purpose of this article is to determine whether 
consumers might use price as a complex signal of quality when judging GM 
products and to discuss the strategic implications if consumers do use price to infer 
quality. 
 
Economists have posed many theoretical models to predict whether price or some 
combination of price and another quality signal such as advertising can effectively 
signal product quality when consumers are not fully informed (e.g., Klein and 
Leffler, 1981; Wolinsky, 1983; Milgrom and Roberts, 1986) and to better understand 
how the introduction of price as a quality signal may impact the shape of consumer 
demand functions (Pollak, 1977) and alter the nature of market equilibrium 
(Balasko, 2003).  Jones and Hudson (1996) developed a model of the price-quality 
relationship at different price levels and concluded that there is a critical price 
interval in which price is used as a signal of quality.  However, the results of their 
paper exclude the role of price as a signal of quality at lower price levels.  They 
suggest that the price above a critical price is used to signal quality while 
discounted prices are not.  
 
While empirical tests are not as common as theoretical work in this area, several 
authors have explored the predictions of various signaling models by correlating 
objective quality assessments of various consumer goods with price, advertising and 
other signals of product quality within particular markets (Landon and Smith, 
wine, 1998; Nichols, cars, 1998; Esposto, cigars, 1998) or across several markets 
(e.g., Hjorth-Andersen, 1991; Caves and Greene, 1996).  Caves and Greene (1996) 
show that quality-price correlations exist in many markets and that the level of 
correlation is higher for product categories that include more brands and is lower 
for convenience goods.   
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Although all these papers approached the issues differently, they each suggest that 
price acts as a signal of quality.  However, most of these papers focus on the 
empirical relationship itself rather than the behavioral effects induced from the 
relationship.  In other words, most of these papers analyze the relationship between 
observed price and objectively-measured quality rather than individual consumer’s 
purchase decisions induced by particular combinations of price and non-price 
quality signals.  For instance, Caves and Greene (1996) analyze the correlations 
between product quality and price using data from Consumer Reports, in which 
experts rate the quality of various products.  Esposto (1997) analyzes the 
relationship between price and quality by estimating a hedonic equation in which 
price is explained by experts’ product quality ratings.  However, these papers do not 
analyze consumers’ consumption choice as a function of price and non-price quality 
signals. 
 
The social and private efficacy of GM technology in food production is an 
increasingly studied issue in food consumption research.  Many studies have 
examined GM acceptance as a food safety issue because, for some people, the 
perceived safety of GM technology is unresolved.  That is, for some, food produced 
with GM technology indicates low quality.  However, others suggest that the 
application of GM technology in food production could decrease food expenditures, 
reduce production costs, improve food attributes such as nutritional content and 
limit environmental problems such as agricultural chemicals residues (the Institute 
of Food Science & Technology, 2004).  For example, Baker et al. (2001) document 
consumer segments that believe GM technologies represent high quality in the corn 
flakes cereals market.   
 
Individuals’ perceptions of the risk associated with particular products vary by 
product and can be greatly influenced by emotion and other subjective factors.  In 
fact, some researchers define risk perception as psychological interpretation of 
product properties (Rozin et al., 1986; Yeung and Morris, 2001).  Hence, signals of 
food safety and other dimensions of quality enter into the consumer’s decision 
calculus.  In the case of GM technology, food safety is likely to be more subjective 
because the safety of its adoption does not meet with uniform perception across all 
segments of consumers, i.e., GM ingredients may horizontally differentiate the 
product, finding favor with some consumers and disfavor with others.  This 
heterogeneity leads to a particularly interesting interaction with price, which is 
often used as a signal of quality.  For consumers with an initial view that GM food 
is safe or beneficial, a higher price may reinforce this initial view of high quality 
and reinforce decisions to purchase the product despite the higher price.  However, 
for consumers with an initial view of GM food as low quality, a low price may 
reinforce these low quality perceptions and nullify price discounts as a means of 
enticing product trial or expanding market share.  Hence, the classical downward-
sloping relationship between price and demand may be challenged.  
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This paper is concerned with the role of price as a quality signal in GM foods.  To 
explore the price-quality relationship, we analyze data collected from the 
administration of a mail-based survey that featured a conjoint (stated-preference) 
instrument in which a national cross-section of consumers chose among 
differentiated bread, corn and egg products.  Product attributes such as price, GM 
content level and negative and positive GM attributions for each product in a choice 
set were experimentally manipulated and randomly assigned across respondents. 
 
These data are used to test the hypothesis that GM product prices act as quality 
signals and the hypothesis that the effectiveness of price as a quality signal differs 
by the type of product.  The remaining structure of this paper is as follows.  The 
next section describes the data and reports summary statistics.  The following 
section explores the relationship between price and respondents’ product choices 
from our survey.  The final section summarizes and concludes.  A technical 




The data were collected from a survey that was sent to 5,462 US residents 
nationally and to an over-sample of 710 residents from one of the authors’ home 
state (Maine).  Two thousand and twelve people from the general sample and 375 
people from the home-state sample returned surveys for a response rate of 37% and 
53%, respectively.  In the econometric analysis, the responses were weighted to 
account for the over-sampling of the home-state residents.   
 
The basic framework of the survey is as follows.  First respondents answer several 
sections of questions that deal with food consumption, food technology and genetic 
modification.  Then, respondents are presented with a choice set for a particular 
product (bread, frozen corn, and eggs) where each set features three options: the 
respondent’s normal brand, a brand with 100% GM content, and brand with no GM 
content.  Labels for the GM and non-GM product were presented and included 
information concerning relative price (cents more or less than normal brand), GM 
content, benefits or warnings associated with GM content, and the name of a firm or 
agency that certified the presence or absence of GM content.  No label was 
presented for the respondent’s normal brand; rather, the words ‘your normal brand’ 
were mentioned in a parallel fashion as a possible choice.   
 
Respondents were asked to assume that their normal brand was produced with a 
particular mix of both GM and Non-GM ingredients; the exact percent of 
ingredients that respondents were told to assume came from GM sources was 
randomly assigned across respondents.  Respondents were also told that all brands 
shared the same appearance, taste, texture, and smell.  
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After viewing the product choices and being reminded of their household budget 
constraint, respondents chose the most preferred option.  Some respondents viewed 
one of the three product choice sets, some viewed two product choice sets and others 
viewed all three product choice sets with the number and order of viewing 
randomized across respondents.  Usable responses include 1,336, 793 and 950 
choices made for the bread, corn and eggs categories, respectively.  The prices used 
in the survey ranged from 40 cents more to 40 cents less than the cost of a package 
of the normal product.  
 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for Socio-Demographics (N=1,967) 
Summary statistics a U.S.  Census b   
Average                                               %  Average                                                % 
Gender  
Male                                      45.0 
Female                                  55.0 
 
 
Male                                       48.3 
Female                                   51.7 
Age 52    47   
No. of 
Children 
0.6   0.9  
Household 
Income($) 





0-11 years                               5.5 
12 years                                27.1 
1-3 years college                   28.5 
College graduate                  22.5 






0-11 years                              19.6 
12 years                                 28.6 
1-3years college                     27.3 
College graduate                   15.5 





White                                    90.0 
Black                                       4.6 
Hispanic or Spanish origin    2.2 
Asian or Pacific Islander        1.9 






White                                      77.1 
Black                                      12.9 
Asian/Pacific Islander            4.5c 
Others                                     6.6d 
Hispanic/Latino                     12.5 
 
 
Concern with GM 
   
3.7 
1- Not at all                            5.2 
2                                              9.8 
3 – Somewhat                       23.2 
4                                            23.5 
5 – Very                                38.3 




   
4.0 
1- Not at all                            4.0 
2                                              6.7 
3 – Somewhat                      19.0 
4                                            21.4 
5 – Very                                48.9 




   
3.3 
1- Not at all                            8.5 
2                                            16.6 
3 – Somewhat                       31.0 
4                                            19.9 
5 – Very                                24.0 
 Not  available 
a The summary statistics are based on the modified data for the paper. The income data and 
education data were collected in ranges and midpoints of each range were used for the table.  The 
concern ratings were for a Likert scale where 1 is ‘Not at all concerned’, 3 is ‘Somewhat concerned, 
and 5 is ‘Very concerned’. 
b  Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Census 2000. 
c Asian or Pacific Islander includes Asian, Native Hawaiian and other Pacific islander. 
d Others include all other respondents not included in the categories of White, Black, and Asian or 
Pacific Islanders.  
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Other elements of the survey provide considerable data that is used to improve the 
explanatory power of econometric models.  Earlier portions of the survey required 
respondents to provide ratings of concern for GM and other food processing 
technologies and to rate a number of different potential benefits and risks 
associated with GM technologies.  The final portion of the survey asks for 
respondents’ gender, age, education level, race, income level, and household 
composition (see Table 1 for descriptive statistics).  We do note that our sample 
features more females, is older, has fewer children in the household, is richer, has 
obtained more formal education, and features fewer minority respondents than the 
general U.S. population.  
 
Several non-price product-specific attributes were also included on some product 
labels.  Some randomly assigned GM products included the following health 
(environmental) warning statement: “Long-term health (environmental) effects are 
currently unknown.”  Some randomly assigned GM products featured claims stating 
that the product was genetically modified to improve either a health attribute 
(increased levels of antioxidants for bread and corn and reduced levels of cholesterol 
for eggs) or an environmental attribute (reduced pesticide use for bread and corn).  
All claims of GM content or absence were accompanied by a certifying statement 
endorsed by either a government agency, environmental organization, or an 
independent certification firm. 
 
Table 2 features a summary of the product choices made by respondents.  About 
half of the respondents chose the non-GM brand in each product category while 
about 20% chose the GM brand. 
 
 
Table 2: Preferred Product in Choice Set 
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Figure 2: The Relationship between the Price of GM Corn and Respondents’ 
Consumption Choice Hwang, et al. / International Food and Agribusiness Management Review Volume 9, Issue 1, 2006 













































The percent of respondents who choose the GM brand in each product category (call 
this the GM market share) is plotted for each price level used in the survey design 
(Figures 1 – 3).  Because the other attributes of GM brand (e.g., health claims and 
warnings) are randomly assigned across respondents in a fashion that is not 
correlated with the relative price that is assigned, the average profile of the GM 
products for each relative price level is similar, meaning one can draw intuition 
from these simple plots.   
 
None of the three graphs reveal a simple, linear, down-hill relationship between 
price and the resulting market share that one might expect.  That is, lowering the 
price does not appear to guarantee an increasing market share for the GM good 
among our respondents.  
 
For the bread product, there is a steady decline in market share for prices within 15 
cents of normal brand’s price (+/-).  However, discounts deeper than 15 cents appear 
counter productive while price premiums in the 20 to 35 cent range appear to have 
a negligible effect on market share.   
 
The corn product features a similar pattern with two slight differences.  First, there 
is very little difference in market share responsiveness for prices that range from a 
nickel discount to a 15-cent premium.  Second, the highest price premium was Hwang, et al. / International Food and Agribusiness Management Review Volume 9, Issue 1, 2006 
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associated with the largest market share of any price premium, suggesting a 
possible role for high price as a positive quality signal. 
 
The egg product is perhaps the closest to the traditional, down-hill relationship 
between price and market share.  Two price discounts do appear to prompt strong 
negative reactions from the sample of respondents.  The greatest discount offered in 
our survey – 40 cents – is associated with a marked reduction in market share as is 
the smallest price discount – five cents.  Both suggest that respondents may use 
discounts as a signal of low quality, though the exact level of discount that can 
trigger such decisions can be large or small. 
 
Taken together, these graphs indicate that some consumers may interpret prices 
below a certain threshold as a negative signal of quality (a “something must be 
wrong with it” heuristic) and choose other options.  This pattern contradicts 
theoretical results forwarded by Jones and Hudson (1996) who suggested that only 
prices above a critical price premium are used for signaling quality (a “if its this 
expensive, it must be good” heuristic).  The GM corn graph is supportive of the 
Jones and Hudson concept, as some of the largest market shares correspond with 
the highest prices.   
 
A more formal, econometric test of the above intuition is conducted using 
respondents’ choices in each product category and using other variables to control 
for potentially confounding explanations.  A more detailed, technical report of the 
methods and results of that investigation is provided in the appendix.   
 
The econometric results suggest that the simple down-hill relationship between 
price and market share is not present for most products and, for the one category in 
which it holds (bread), it is only statistically significant when crossing from 
discounts (prices that are less than the normal brand’s reference price) to premiums 
(prices that are greater than the reference price).  A more flexible model, which 
doesn’t force the data to be fit to a regression line but instead allows the data to be 
fit to a regression curve, provides the best statistical fit for the corn category.  In 
other words, the statistical results suggest that, once all the potentially confounding 
factors such as labeling treatments and respondent characteristics are controlled, 
price is not linearly related to market share.  Rather, market share initially 
increases when moving from deep discounts to modest discounts, then declines as 
prices move from modest discounts to modest premiums, and finally increases once 




The purpose of this paper is to analyze how prices of GM products may act as 
quality signals and affect consumers’ purchase decisions.  Three products (GM 
bread, corn, and eggs) are analyzed using conjoint data generated from a national Hwang, et al. / International Food and Agribusiness Management Review Volume 9, Issue 1, 2006 
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mail survey.  Plots of the relationship between price and the share of consumers 
choosing GM products in each category suggest the relationship between price and 
market share may not adhere to a simple linear relationship where an increase in 
price decreases market share.  Econometric analysis confirms that nonlinear 
relationships may best describe the relationship between price and respondents’ 
choices of GM products.   
 
This evidence suggests that consumers may use price as a signal of product quality 
when price deviates enough from the normal brand’s price.  Consumers’ purchase 
intentions for GM bread increased as price declined modestly below the reference 
price down to a critical price level; after this price threshold, lowering prices had no 
real traction in increasing market share in GM bread.  The plot of GM eggs showed 
little significant difference from general economic theory.  That is, the price-demand 
relationship was linear and downward sloping over the whole price range.  The only 
indication of the existence of price signaling quality was that the very largest and 
the very smallest price discounts were associated with marked reductions in market 
share.  When combined with evidence from econometric models of respondents’ 
choices of GM products, it suggests that respondents use the price of GM products 
as a signal of quality.  Further survey work would need to be conducted where 
respondents are specifically asked to rate perceived product quality after viewing 
price and non-price information for GM and non-GM products.  Furthermore, one 
must realize that the current investigation used products that were not branded in 
other ways (e.g., with company or product-line brand names).  The introduction of 
such information onto the label may change some of the results, giving either more 
or less latitude to enact pricing strategies featuring deeper discounts or greater 
premiums. 
 
Food products with labeled GM ingredients are in an introduction (start-up) period 
of their life cycle in most product categories.  Firms who try to gain public 
awareness for their products and to expand their market share might, for example, 
have to decide between a low introductory pricing strategy, a price matching 
strategy, or strategy that sets price higher than competing, non-GM brands.  If 
consumers use price as a signal of quality, however, some of these pricing strategies 
might be less effective or disastrous in certain product categories.  For the 
hypothetical GM corn product in our research, for example, firms pursuing a low-
introductory price strategy may fight an uphill battle because respondents may 
interpret low prices as a negative quality signal and avoid the trial purchases 
necessary to spur current and future sales.  Furthermore, if retailers unilaterally 
discount GM products (e.g., in order to clear shelves of slow-moving trial products), 
the discounting could send an unintended message to consumers that GM 
ingredients are of low quality.  There exists a possibility that this might spill over to 
consumers’ perceptions of other GM products as well.   
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Consumption patterns for GM products are likely to vary widely across different 
consumer segments, where each segment may hold distinct ideas concerning the 
value, efficacy and safety of GM ingredients.  Hence, choosing a marketing strategy 
will not be a simple matter.  In fact, applying a pricing strategy alone as a 
marketing strategy without considering consumers’ characteristics might not be 
effective for expanding market share of GM products.  Pricing strategies may need 
to be tailored to the type of retail outlet (e.g., high-end food emporiums versus 
discount chains) and coordinated with non-price quality signals (advertising and in-
store promotions) and existing regulatory interventions (labeling or public position 
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To estimate the factors that drive respondents’ choices of GM versus non-GM 
products, an econometric model is estimated that links a respondent’s decision 
concerning whether to choose the GM brand (instead of either their normal brand or 
the GM-free brand) to characteristics of GM product (including price), the price of a 
GM-free option, and characteristics of the respondent.  The variables used to 
represent the GM product’s and the respondent’s characteristics are detailed in 
Table A1.   
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Table A1: Description of Variables for Logit model of GM Brand Choice 
Variable Name  Description     
Dependent Variable:  (i ∈ {B, C, E} where B=Bread, C=Corn, E=Eggs)   
Choice_B, Choice_C, 
Choice_E 
= 1 if respondents choose GM brand for product i  
  = 0 if respondents choose other brands for product i  
Independent Variable:    
DPi  
The price of the normal brand less the price of the GM brand in cents for product 
category i. 
Di,k                                
Di,k = 1 if the price of the normal brand in category i less the price of the GM brand 
in cents is in the range of [k, k + 5] for k = -40, -30, -20, -10, 5, 15, 25, 35; = 0 
otherwise.  
DPi_SQ                       (DPi + 40)2   
DPi_TR (DPi + 40)3  
DPNGMi  
The price of the normal brand less the price of the non-GM brand in cents for 
product category i 
GOV  = 1 if certifying agency was a government agency   
  = 0 otherwise     
ENV 
= 1 if certifying agency was an environmental 
agency 
 
  = 0 otherwise     
IND  = 1 if certifying agency was an independent certifier   
  = 0 otherwise     
BANTIA, CANTIA 
 
= 1 if GM bread (BANTIA) and GM corn (CANTIA) claims to be more healthful due 
to heightened levels of antioxidants 
  = 0 otherwise     
BLTHA, CLTHA, ELTHA 
 
= 1 if GM bread (BLTHA), GM corn (CLTHA), and GM eggs (ELTHA) have a 
health warning label 
  0 otherwise     
BLTEA, CLTEA, ELTEA 
= 1 if GM bread (BLTEA), GM corn (CLTEA), and GM eggs (ELTEA) have an 
environmental warning label 
  = 0 otherwise     
LBPREDA   ln(% reduction in pesticides used in growing wheat for GM bread + 1) 
LCPREDA  ln(% reduction in pesticides used in growing GM corn + 1) 
LEPREDA 
ln(% reduction in cholesterol due to use of GM eggs 
+ 1) 
 
GMCONCERN  = 1 if respondent rated GM technology a ‘5’ on a 5-point scale of concern,  
  = 0 otherwise     
OWNBEN  Respondent factor score relating to GM’s benefits for consumers 
PRODBEN  Respondent factor score relating to GM’s benefits for producers 
OWNCOST  Respondent factor score relating to GM’s cost reductions for consumers 
PRODCOST  Respondent factor score relating to GM’s cost reductions for producers 
BREADGM  Respondent’s estimate of % of normal bread made from GM wheat 
CORNGM  Respondent’s estimate of % of normal corn made from GM corn 
EGGSGM  Respondent’s estimate of % of normal eggs made from GM eggs 
MALE  = 1 if male, = 0 if female   
RACE  = 1 if White, = 0 otherwise   
AGE_30  = 1 if under 30 years old, = 0 otherwise   
AGE_70  = 1  if over 70 years old, = 0 otherwise   
ED16  = 1 if obtained a Bachelor’s degree or more, = 0 otherwise 
INC_L  = 1 if annual household income ≤ $5,000, = 0 otherwise 
INC_H  = 1 if annual household income ≥ $95,000, = 0 otherwise 
CHILD  = 1 if children present in household, = 0 otherwise 
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Our key hypothesis is that the price of the GM product might act as a signal of the 
product’s quality to the respondent.  So, relatively low prices for the GM product 
might signal low quality and cause consumers to reject it, while high prices might 
signal high quality and cause consumers to embrace it.  If prices are not acting as a 
signal of quality, low prices should stimulate sales while high prices will depress 
sales. 
 
The statistical challenge is how to test for this unusual correspondence between 
price and sales.  Usually price enters as a single explanatory variable in 
econometric models, which implies a simple, linear relationship between sales and 
price – e.g., every dime increase in price will lead to the same reduction in sales.   
 
This does not allow us to test for our key hypothesis.  Therefore, we alter the 
standard model in two ways.  First, in addition to using price as an explanatory 
variable in our econometric model, we also add in the square and cube of price (e.g., 
price2 and price3).  An econometric model that uses the square and cube of price 
allows for a more flexible relationship between sales and price, e.g., sales could first 
increase with an increase in price (e.g., when going from deep discounts to modest 
discounts), then decline with an increase of price (e.g., for prices near competing 
brands), and finally increase with increases of price (e.g., for prices at a modest 
premium above competing brands).  Using econometric methods, we can then test to 
see if the data reveals this non-linear relationship between sales and price. 
 
Our second approach is to treat each price category separately within the 
econometric analysis.  Therefore, we create eight categorical variables for each 10-
cent price interval and include these variables in the econometric analysis.  Using 
econometric analysis, we can then test for differences between pricing intervals.  If 
the traditional price-consumption relationship holds, we should find that sales of 
products with discounts of, say, 40 and 35 cents, will be greater than sales of 
products with discounts of 25 and 30 cents, etc. 
 
To statistically isolate the effect of price on sales, we must control for all other 
possible explanations that might drive a respondent’s choice.  Hence, we add 
explanatory variables that will control for the randomly assigned attributes of the 
GM product (claims and warnings), the randomly assigned price of the GM-free 
brand, and for respondent’s attitudes toward GM technology and personal 
characteristics.  Summary statistics for each variable is presented in Table A2. 
 
The econometric approach that is used involves the estimation of a binomial logit 
model for each GM product of the form: 
 
A1)     Y*= α0 + Σ αiFi (pGM) + X′ β + ε 
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where 
* Y  is a latent preference index that, when it is greater than zero, represents 
the intended purchase of the GM product (i.e., causes, Y, the observed variable, to 
equal one if the GM product is purchased and equal zero otherwise); α0 is an 
intercept parameter; Fi(•) is the ith function of the relative price of the GM brand 
(pGM); αi is the ith parameter associated with the ith function of price; X is a vector 
of all independent variables except GM brand prices; β is a conformable vector of 
parameters; andε  is the error term.  Two general forms of the Fi(•) functions were 
articulated in Table A2: one where dummy variables are created to represent eight 
different price categories and one where a polynomial in the price of the GM food is 
created (e.g., price2 and price3).  The polynomial representation is Fj = (DP + 40)j, 
where 40 is added to all relative prices of GM products, i.e., all prices are 
normalized to the lowest possible price offered, to avoid squaring a negative 
number.   
 
The estimation results for each product are in Tables A3-A5.  To test the hypothesis 
that the market share of GM products adheres to the classical downward-sloping 
pattern, the following hypotheses are formulated when price is represented by 
categorical dummy-variables:  
 
A2) H0:  αi > αi+1    i = 1, 2, …, 7                               
 H 1:  αi ≤ αi+1  i = 1, 2, …, 7 
 
A3) H0: α1 = α2  = α3 = α4 = α5  = α6 = α7 = α8                
 H 1: α1 ≠ α2  ≠ α3 ≠ α4 ≠ α5  ≠ α6 ≠ α7 ≠ α8            
 
A4) H0: α1 = α2  = α3 = α4                                                              
H1: α1 ≠ α2  ≠ α3 ≠ α4 
 
A5) H0: α5  = α6 = α7 = α8                                                             
H1: α5  ≠ α6 ≠ α7 ≠ α8            
 
The first hypothesis (A2) postulates seven separate inequalities where the 
parameter for each lower price category is strictly larger (i.e., more likely to induce 
the choice of the GM product) than the parameter for the higher, adjacent price 
category.  Rejection of this hypothesis means that market share is not strictly 
downward sloping across adjacent pairs of price categories.  The second hypothesis 
(A3) flips the approach by postulating that all price parameters are equal; rejection 
merely confirms all price points do not have the same effect on market share. 
Hypotheses (A4) and (A5) are limited versions of (A3) and test for insensitivity to 
price across all price discounts (α1 - α4) and all price premiums (α5 - α8).  Hypothesis 
testing results for each product category are listed in Table A6.   
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Table A2: Summary Statistics for Variables of Logit model of GM Brand Choice 
Variable Name  Average  Share (%)  MIN  MAX 
Choice_B   18.0     
Choice_C   21.0     
Choice_E   17.0     
GOV   77.1     
ENV   4.8     
IND   7.1     
BANTIA   8.6     
CANTIA   7.2     
BLTHA      34.0     
CLTHA   33.8     
ELTHA   32.8     
BLTEA   33.4     
CLTEA   30.8     
ELTEA   34.4     
LBPREDA 2.01    0  4.62 
LCPREDA 1.99    0  4.62 
LEPREDA 2.14    0  4.62 
GMCONCERN   37.7     
OWNBEN -0.02    -3.87  2.99 
PRODBEN 0.01    -3.76  2.80 
OWNCOST 0.02    -4.57  2.63 
PRODCOST -0.01    -3.91  3.53 
BREADGM 42.50    2  90 
CORNGM 42.00    1  90 
EGGSGM 41.50    1  90 
MALE    45   
RACE      90   
AGE_30   9.8  18  29 
AGE_70   17.5  70 93 
ED16   22.1     
INC_L   4.2     
INC_H   16.3     
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Table A3: Regression Results for Bread (binary logit) (N=1,336) 
Polynomial Approach  Dummy Variable Approach 
Explanatory 






Dependent Variable: Choice_B 
INTERCEPT  -2.61  -6.82*** -  - 
DPB  -0.02  -5.22*** -  - 
DB,-40  - -  -2.14  -5.22*** 
DB,-30  - -  -1.97  -4.79*** 
DB, -20  - -  -2.37  -5.40*** 
DB, -10  - -  -2.34  -5.58*** 
DB, 5  - -  -2.89  -6.51*** 
DB, 15  - -  -2.93  -6.42*** 
DB, 25  - -  -3.09  -6.70*** 
DB, 35  - -  -3.16  -6.85*** 
DPNGMB  0.01  1.90* 0.01  1.90* 
GOV  0.44  1.65*  0.44 1.64 
ENV  -0.37 -0.71  -0.33 -0.64 
IND  -0.09 -0.23  -0.09 -0.21 
BANTIA  1.06  3.81*** 1.02  3.63*** 
BLTHA  -0.58  -3.07*** -0.57  -3.02*** 
BLTEA -0.30 -1.64  -0.29 -1.61 
LBPREDA  0.29  6.68*** 0.30  6.64*** 
GMCONCERN  -0.60  -3.41*** -0.61  -3.45*** 
OWNBEN -3.10E-03  -0.05  -0.01  -0.16 
PRODBEN 3.47E-03  0.06  0.01  0.16 
OWNCOST  -0.16  -2.54** -0.16  -2.58*** 
PRODCOST  0.16  2.53** 0.16  2.57** 
BREADGM  0.01 1.60  0.01 1.54 
MALE  -0.03 -0.21  -0.04 -0.28 
RACE 1.53E-03  1.52 1.61E-03  1.60 
AGE_30  -0.82  -2.21** -0.83  -2.26** 
AGE_70 0.23 1.17  0.22 1.10 
ED16  0.46  2.53** 0.46  2.53** 
INC_L  -0.01 -0.05  -0.02 -0.11 
INC_H  0.01 0.05  0.02 0.11 
CHILD  -1.56E-03  -2.00** -1.65E-03  -2.12** 
a *, **, ***: significant at the ten, five, and one % level, respectively. 
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Table A4: Regression Results Corn (binary logit) (N=793) 
Polynomial Approach  Dummy Variable Approach 
Explanatory 






Dependent Variable: Choice_C 
INTERCEPT  -1.82  -3.55*** -  - 
DPC 0.05  1.64  -  - 
DPC_SQ  -1.89E-03  -2.00** -  - 
DPC_TR  1.53E-05  1.95* -  - 
DC,-40 -  -  -1.66  -3.46*** 
DC,-30 -  -  -1.43  -3.01*** 
DC, -20 -  -  -1.48  -2.93*** 
DC, -10 -  -  -1.41  -2.91*** 
DC, 5 -  -  -1.94  -3.76*** 
DC, 15 -  -  -2.17  -4.30*** 
DC, 25 -  -  -2.17  -4.00*** 
DC, 35 -  -  -1.94  -4.03*** 
DPNGMC 1.76E-03  0.48  1.87E-03  0.51 
GOV  0.11 0.36 0.10  0.34 
ENV  -0.22 -0.39 -0.26  -0.47 
IND  -1.40  -2.09** -1.45  -2.15** 
CANTIA  0.59  1.65*  0.58 1.62 
CLTHA  -0.66  -2.85*** -0.67  -2.85*** 
CLTEA  -0.26 -1.21 -0.26  -1.20 
LCPREDA  0.24  4.81*** 0.24  4.86*** 
GMCONCERN  -0.45  -2.08** -0.45  -2.06** 
OWNBEN  0.11 1.55 0.12  1.62 
PRODBEN -0.11 -1.55 -0.12  -1.62 
OWNCOST  -0.14  -1.93* -0.14  -1.88* 
PRODCOST  0.14  1.93* 0.14  1.87* 
CORNGM -1.19E-03  -0.22  -8.68E-04  -0.16 
MALE  0.28 1.44 0.29  1.50 
RACE -2.48E-05  -0.02  -6.94E-05  -0.06 
AGE_30  0.04 0.10 0.03  0.07 
AGE_70  0.31 1.22 0.30  1.18 
ED16  0.33 1.53 0.32  1.50 
INC_L  0.26 1.15 0.26  1.12 
INC_H  -0.26 -1.16 -0.26  -1.12 
CHILD 9.98E-04  0.66  1.02E-03  0.68 
a *, **, ***: significant at the ten, five, and one % level, respectively. 
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Table A5: Regression Results for Eggs (binary logit) (N=950) 








Dependent Variable: Choice_E 
INTERCEPT  -2.11  -4.68*** -  - 
DPE  -0.01  -2.98*** -  - 
DE,-40  - -  -1.78  -3.60*** 
DE,-30 -  -  -1.82  -3.64*** 
DE, -20 -  -  -1.70  -3.27*** 
DE, -10 -  -  -2.18  -4.30*** 
DE, 5 -  -  -1.92  -3.80*** 
DE, 15 -  -  -2.32  -4.45*** 
DE, 25 -  -  -2.62  -4.81*** 
DE, 35 -  -  -2.47  -4.64*** 
DPNGME  0.01  2.91*** 0.01  2.88*** 
GOV  0.45 1.32 0.46  1.34 
ENV  0.06 0.11 0.07  0.12 
IND  -0.23 -0.42 -0.23  -0.42 
ELTHA  -0.21 -0.96 -0.21  -0.96 
ELTEA  -0.42  -1.86* -0.42  -1.87* 
LEPREDA  0.20  4.35*** 0.20  4.31*** 
GMCONCERN  -0.56  -2.80*** -0.56  -2.80*** 
OWNBEN  0.14  1.98** 0.13  1.89* 
PRODBEN  -0.14  -1.98** -0.13  -1.89* 
OWNCOST  -0.15  -2.15** -0.15  -2.15** 
PRODCOST  0.15  2.15** 0.15  2.15** 
EGGSGM  0.01 0.94 4.16E-03  0.83 
MALE  -0.02 -0.08 -0.02  -0.10 
RACE 8.02E-05  0.10  -4.93E-06  -0.01 
AGE_30  -0.41 -1.20 -0.38  -1.10 
AGE_70  -0.34 -1.29 -0.34  -1.27 
ED16  0.01 0.06 0.02  0.11 
INC_L  0.19 0.79 0.19  0.81 
INC_H  -0.19 -0.79 -0.19  -0.81 
CHILD -1.69E-04  -0.20  -7.30E-05  -0.08 
a *, **, ***: significant at the ten, five, and one % level, respectively. 
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Table A6: Likelihood Ratio Test Results 
Hypothesis  i  Bread Corn  Eggs  Critical  Values 
1 0.39  0.45  0.02 
2 2.16  0.02  0.14 
3 0.01  0.04  1.87 
4    3.36*  2.08  0.54 
5 0.02  0.31  1.23 
6 0.18  4.40E-05  0.57 
(3) H0:   1 + α > α i i   H1:  1 + α ≤ α i i        7 , , 1Λ = i  
7 0.43  0.32  0.12 
3.84(5%) 
2.71(10%) 
(4) H0: 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 α α α α α α α α = = = = = = =  
    H1:  8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 α α α α α α α α ≠ ≠ ≠ ≠ ≠ ≠ ≠   




(5) H0:   4 3 2 1 α α α α = = =    
    H1:  4 3 2 1 α α α α ≠ ≠ ≠  
2.97 0.65 2.42 
[0.22, 9.35](5%) 
[0.35, 7.81](10%)
(6) H0:   8 7 6 5 α α α α = = =                                      
    H1:  8 7 6 5 α α α α ≠ ≠ ≠             
0.81 0.64 3.44 
[0.22, 9.35](5%) 
[0.35, 7.81](10%)
  *,** signifies the hypothesis is rejected at the ten and five % level, respectively. 
 
 
The null hypothesis in (A2), i.e., uniform downward-sloping demand across price 
categories, is rejected at the ten percent significance level for all adjacent price 
points of all products except for  4 = i  in the bread category, which means that 
downward-sloping demand between the price categories of [-$0.10, -$0.05] and 
[$0.05, $0.10] cannot be rejected.  For all other adjacent price points and all 
products, cheaper GM products are not significantly more likely to be chosen than 
ones slightly more expensive.   
 
The null hypothesis of (A3), i.e., equivalence of the effect of all price categories on 
purchase decisions, is rejected at the ten percent significance level only in the bread 
category.  It suggests that there is significant sensitivity of choice to price in the 
bread category but not much price sensitivity in the corn and egg categories.  The 
null hypotheses of (A4) and (A5) refine the results by validating that, across all 
relative prices that share the same sign, there is no significant difference in market 
share’s response across price categories.  Taken together the test results suggest 
that a downward sloping relationship is not present for most products and, for the 
one category in which demand slopes downward in some price regions, it is only 
significant when crossing the threshold from prices that are greater than the 
normal brand’s reference price to prices that are less than the reference price. 
 
Despite a lack of price category by price category change in market share, a simpler 
regression featuring choice as a linear function of price may reveal the expected 
negative relationship.  Therefore, a second approach to examining the slope of 
demand is used: we test for the significance of higher-order terms in polynomial 
representations of GM price, i.e., to see if the price2 and price3 terms are 
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only the linear relative price variables (DPB and DPE) were significant; results 
featuring higher order terms are omitted.  DPB and DPE affected consumer choices 
of GM bread and eggs in negative manner, which is consistent with standard theory 
and suggests that the role of price in signaling quality is not strong enough to cause 
a curvilinear relationship between price and market share.  
 
For the model of the GM frozen corn choice, the square and cube of the relative price 
of GM corn are significant (DPC_SQ and DPC_TR, respectively).  This suggests the 
possibility of a significant, curvilinear change in the consumption pattern as price 
changes.  At lower prices, the probability of choosing the GM corn decreases even if 
price is lowered further.  However, the probability of choosing GM corn increases at 
higher prices when price is raised further.  This retains the basic shape observed 
from the raw data plot in figure 2.  The ability of such a cubic relationship to hold 
beyond the narrow price range explored is, of course, highly questionable.  
Minimally as price continues toward zero market share can go no lower than zero, 




Taking the results from the price-category approach and the polynomial approach 
together, there appears to be some evidence that demand for the GM products does 
not uniformly decrease with price.  The most convincing evidence exists for GM 
corn: both the dummy variable and polynomial approaches reject uniform, 
downward sloping demand.  The weakest case exists for GM bread: the dummy 
variable approach suggests demand drops going from categories featuring price 
discounts to categories featuring price premiums and no higher-order terms are 
significant in the polynomial approach.  An intermediate case exists for GM eggs: 
the dummy variable approach finds no case for downward sloping demand in price 
while the polynomial case finds no significance for higher-order terms. 
 
While there is some evidence against a downward-sloping demand in price, one may 
argue that factors other than price-quality signals drive this lack of adherence to 
the classical case.  One argument could be that respondents faced hypothetical 
choices and, hence, did not seriously weigh price when contemplating GM product 
choice.  Indeed, such critiques of hypothetical questionnaires are common in the 
early literature concerning hypothetical choices.  However, more recent research 
involving parallel hypothetical and market decisions suggests that analysis of 
hypothetical choices provide an unbiased view of individual preferences in many 
settings, particularly those involving familiar private goods, though estimates are 
typically noisier, i.e., individual parameter estimates have a greater variance 
(Louviere et al. 1999).   
 
Our own data suggest that respondents did treat price variables seriously: the price 
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manner, are significant in two of the three product regressions.  This suggests that 
prices were impacting respondent decisions in a traditional way for non-GM goods.  
The category in which the non-GM price was insignificant was corn, which is also 
the category for which downward-sloping demand of the GM product was the 
weakest.  All tolled this leaves a mixed though intriguing case for the possibility 
that respondents were using price as a signal of quality when evaluating GM 
products. 
 